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Abstract. In the article ‘Against Physicalism-plus-God: How Creation Accounts 
for Divine Action in the World’ (Jaeger 2012a), I defined a framework which 
allows us to make some progress in our understanding of how God acts in the 
world. In the present article, I apply this framework to the specific question of 
chance events. I show that chance does not provide an explanation for special 
divine action. Nevertheless, chance does not hamper God’s ability to act in the 
world, and creation provides a  framework for the understanding of chance, 
which is akin to what we see in modern science.
DEFINITIONS: WHAT IS CHANCE?
Chance is a notoriously difficult concept. Different authors use it with 
different meanings, and the same author can use several meanings in 
different contexts, sometimes without any explanation (and perhaps 
sometimes without being aware of the shift of meaning). Thus it is crucial 
to provide a precise definition, in order to avoid unnecessary confusions.
I  offer the following basic definition: A  chance event (fact, state of 
affairs, etc.) is an event (fact, state of affairs, etc.) without cause. Please 
note right from the start that chance as the absence of a cause can never 
be used as an explanation of anything. The affirmation that something 
happens ‘by chance’ does not mean that ‘chance’ produced it, but that 
it happened without a  cause, which is the very opposite of a  (causal) 
explanation.
1 For a fuller treatment of chance, see Jaeger (2014).
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The basic definition gives rise to a variety of distinctions, as ‘without 
cause’ can have different meanings. The most important ones for our 
reflection are the following:
 – Inexistence or ignorance of cause? In the age of classical science, 
it was believed that every event has a  cause. For Leibniz, the 
principle of causality was logically necessary, it was as certain as 
3 x 3 = 9.2 Following Hume’s criticism of (efficient) causality, Kant 
reinstates causality as a category of the faculty of understanding. 
It is the result of a synthetic a priori judgement: although it is not 
logically necessary, it is nevertheless true a priori, that is before any 
experience (Kant 1781: III, 92s/IV, 65s). In fact, no experience (in 
the scientific sense) is possible without presupposing the universal 
reign of causality. If we do not take for granted that all that happens 
is the effect of a cause, our senses would register impressions, but it 
would be impossible to integrate these into a system, which could 
count as scientific experience (Kant 1781: III, 167).
In such a  perspective, chance can only stem from the limits of our 
knowledge. But quantum mechanics has undermined confidence in the 
universal reign of causality. Although discussions go on, the prominent 
interpretation today considers that there is ‘real’ chance in the atomic 
and subatomic world. It is still possible to formulate a more limited law 
of causality following the lines of Kantian transcendental reasoning, in 
close connection with incomplete objectivation prevalent in quantum 
mechanics.
 – Chance à la Cournot (the encounter of two independent causal 
chains) or indeterminism? There is place for (a  certain form of) 
chance in a completely deterministic universe: Antoine Augustin 
Cournot, following Aristotle and J. S. Mill, defined a chance event as 
the encounter of two independent causal chains. As an illustration, 
let us remember the strange happenings on February 15, 2013. 
Astrophysicists had calculated that an  asteroid would pass the 
earth at a short distance. The same day and without having been 
predicted, another smaller asteroid penetrated the atmosphere 
over Tcheliabinsk, at the border of Siberia and caused considerable 
damage. The orbits of both asteroids were determined by the law of 
2  Mittelstaedt (1989: 149), who quotes G. W.  Leibniz, Von dem Verhängnisse, 
Hauptschriften  II, p. 129. See Mittelstaedt (1989: chap. V) concerning the principle of 
causality in classical and quantum physics.
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gravity, thus were not without cause. Nevertheless it makes sense to 
ask if the fact that both events took place the same day was due to 
chance, that is without correlation. In fact, scientists have not come 
to an agreement on this question: whereas several studies did not 
point to any link between the two asteroids, an article published in 
Nature tried to show that both had been part of a bigger asteroid 
which broke up (Borovička et al. 2013).3
 – Without an  efficient cause (which produces the event) or without 
a  final cause (aim, purpose)? Another distinction is inspired by 
the Aristotelian theory of causality, his famous four causes. Taking 
up two of them, the efficient or moving cause is what produces 
the event (the movement, the change), it is this cause which we 
normally have in mind when we talk about causality today. The 
final cause refers to the aim, the purpose for which something is 
produced. The final cause points to the project, the design behind 
the events. Modern physics has largely discarded final causality. 
But the concept is still relevant in biology and even more in the 
human sciences. The easiest way to grasp the distinction is to 
think of an artefact: efficient causality is interested in the chain of 
physico-chemical causes which have led to the production of a pair 
of glasses, for example. Final causality underlines the fact that it is 
also true that the glasses were produced in order to allow a short- 
or longsighted person to see better. Concerning chance, it can be 
asked if, under certain conditions, an end can be pursued in the 
absence of efficient causality: is it possible to realise a project with 
the aid of stochastic phenomena, or does chance exclude design?
 – Without a  cause accessible to science or without any cause at all? 
Unless one thinks that science provides a  complete picture of 
reality, and that there is nothing outside science, one should not 
conclude from the absence of causality in the scientific description 
of an event, that there is no cause at all. God is not a physical cause, 
thus it is important not to confuse chance on the level of scientific 
explanation with the absence of transcendent determination.
3 See the section ‘Coincidental asteroid approach’ of the article ‘Chelyabinsk meteor’ on 
Wikipedia for bibliographical information on those studies which favour a coincidence. 
Available at: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Russian_meteor_event> [accessed 
December 18, 2013].
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 – Indeterminism or unpredictability? One could think (and Laplace 
thought) that the absence of chance guarantees predictability. 
Laplace’s intelligence incarnates his conviction that all past and 
future can be calculated in a deterministic world, if only its state 
is completely known at one moment (Laplace 1814: 2). But in 
fact, this view is too simple. For there are stochastic processes 
which are perfectly predictable: Boyle’s law correlates the volume, 
temperature and pressure of an ideal gas. The underlying molecular 
movements are stochastic, but their averages follow a  strict 
deterministic law. At the same time, there exist deterministic 
systems with an unpredictable future. These are the famous ‘chaotic’ 
systems: although they are described by deterministic equations, 
the smallest difference at one moment will lead to exponentially 
divergent futures.
CHANCE AS EXPLANATION FOR DIVINE ACTION?
After these preliminary clarifications, let us turn to the central theme of 
this article: divine action in connection with chance. The first topic I want 
to examine more closely (in this and the next section) is the conviction 
of several scientist-theologians that chance is central to understanding 
how God acts in the world. They do not want to limit God’s action to 
the preservation of the natural order, but want to make room for specific 
divine acts, without violating the laws of nature which God instituted at 
creation.
The problem they raise is the following: in a deterministic world, one 
can believe in general providence, because the world would not continue 
to exist and function as it does without the divinely given laws. But what 
about special providence? What about prayers which are answered, 
special blessings promised to the faithful? If they imply violating the laws 
of nature, one would need to understand why God does not respect the 
laws which he himself has given. If special providence does not violate 
natural laws, such a  theistic world would strangely resemble a  deistic 
world. For the deist, God abandons the world to its evolution following 
laws established at creation; for the theist, God remains active in the 
world. But its evolution would completely follow from the deterministic 
pre-established laws. Therefore this theistic world would have exactly the 
same history as a deistic world, if only initial conditions are the same. 
Same ‘answers’ to prayer, same blessings ‘given’ to the faithful.
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For this reason (without rejecting general providence), some 
scientist-theologians look to chance, in order to provide room for divine 
action in what is left undetermined by probabilistic laws. They consider 
that one finds here the leeway necessary in order to understand how 
God enters into relation with humans, punishes their sins, answers their 
prayers... Unsurprisingly, quantum mechanics occupies centre stage: 
Robert Russell, founder and director of the Center for Theology and the 
Natural Sciences at Berkeley is currently one of the best-known advocates 
of the idea that quantum indeterminism is central to a  good grasp of 
divine action.4 Ian Barbour, who is often credited of being the father 
of the contemporary science-faith dialogue, favours another strange 
property of quantum systems: non-locality (Barbour 2006: 118). John 
Polkinghorne looks instead to the unpredictability of chaotic systems in 
order to make place for divine action in our world.5
Although these proposals try to make sense of divine action in the 
light of contemporary science, they face important scientific problems. 
With regard to quantum theory, research following up the EPR-paradox 
formulated by Einstein (J. S. Bell, Alain Aspect) has shown that quantum 
mechanics is not incomplete in the sense that it would leave gaps which 
could be filled by divine intervention. We have to be very cautious when 
transferring our common sense intuitions on causality to the reign of 
quantum mechanics. They were formed in the macroscopic world of 
everyday experience and lead us into error when applied to the quantum 
world. In addition, it is quite unclear, even if it were possible to ‘squeeze’ 
divine action inside the boundaries of what is left undetermined by 
Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty, that this would provide any leeway 
for significant action. In the analogous case of human action, Peter 
Clarke has convincingly argued that quantum effects are far too small 
to account for human freedom.6 The hope that quantum indeterminism 
would provide an explanation of free (divine or human) action would 
seem to be an illusion.
4 See Wetger-McNelly (2006: 96-111) and Polkinghorne (2006: 137-45).
5 See Smedes (2004: passim) for a good presentation and critique of these proposals.
6 For example, Heisenbergian uncertainty is more than 100.000 times smaller than 
what would be needed to change even the most feeble chemical bond. And in order 
to function at typical body temperatures, the brain must be stabilized against thermal 
noise. But thermal perturbations are about a  billion times bigger than any quantum 
uncertainty. See Clarke (2010; 2014).
156 LYDIA JAEGER
Concerning Polkinghorne’s appeal to chaos, as far as we know, chaos 
only happens in classical systems, so that it does not introduce any true 
indeterminism, but only a lack of predictability.7
It follows from these considerations that, if there was a difficulty of 
allowing divine action in the deterministic world of classical physics, the 
indeterministic theories of contemporary physics would not be of any 
help. But let us remember that the founding fathers of classical physics 
(Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Descartes...) did not think that there was any 
problem for God to act in the world their science described. Not only 
was God as the Creator responsible for the natural order, but also, for 
example, Newton’s immense interest in biblical prophecies shows that 
he believed in the God who continued to be active in the created world.8
GOD’S ACTION BEYOND THE SCIENTIFICALLY CORRECT
In fact, on reflection, the question is quite bizarre: How does God act in 
the world? It’s his world. He has created it and continually sustains it by 
his providence. ‘For in him we live and move and have our being’, as Paul 
declared in Athens (Ac 17:28).9 Thus there is no need to find gaps in the 
scientific description in order to make room for divine action. It cannot 
be limited to what chance leaves undetermined.
But there is still the objection that God would be inconsistent if he 
went against the laws he himself has instituted. In response, it should 
be noted that a law of nature only fixes the behaviour of a system as far 
as there is no external cause interfering with it: the pen falls to the earth 
according to the law of gravity – unless I put out my hand and retain 
it; two electrically charged balls move away from each other following 
Coulomb’s law  – unless a  strong magnet is close by, which has to be 
integrated into the calculations ... Any law only applies if all acting causes 
are taken into account.
That is the reason why it is not correct to define a miracle as a violation 
of the laws of nature. It is instead the intervention of an external cause, 
and more precisely of a non-natural cause. Laws of nature describe what 
normally happens, under the condition that such an  external action 
7 I explain more fully these scientific problems in Jaeger (2012a: 297-9).
8 See Newton (1974a; 1974b).
9 Unless otherwise stated, all Scripture quotes are taken from the New International 
Version.
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(apart from general providence) is absent. The ordinary formulation of 
laws leaves this condition implicit, which leads to the wrong impression 
that such an intervention would violate them (Lewis 1960: chap. 8).
Some are unconvinced by such a line of argument and point to the 
beauty of a  world where everything happens according to a  small set 
of simple laws. But one might question the validity of such an aesthetic 
intuition: Is it up to us to decide what suits best for God’s action in 
the world? An analogy may help us to understand that deviating from 
the normal rules may not lessen the overall beauty of a  work. To the 
newcomer, any violation of the rules of grammar and style are forbidden 
when writing poetry, as he would be tempted to thus cover his lack of 
imagination and mastery of the language. But the accomplished poet 
allows himself, at certain chosen moments, to deviate from the rules, 
in order to create special effects. Far from impeding the beauty of the 
poem, these deviations better bring to light the author’s intentions and 
underline the unity which the text finds in them.10 In an analogous vein, 
the unity of what happens in the world is to be found in God’s active will. 
Departures from regular patterns (which we discern as laws of nature) 
are not disconnected from the overall fabric of events, but serve, together 
with the ‘normal’ happenings, the plan of the one Creator and Governor 
of the universe.
For the Christian, laws of nature do not limit what God does in the 
world, and miracles are possible (and even real!). This fact takes away 
much of the motivation behind chance models of divine action. Does 
this means that there are two, and only two modes of divine action in 
the world: the preservation of the ordinary reign of natural laws (general 
providence) and miracles? It may be possible (but I recognise that this 
proposal is speculative) to view these two modes of action not as strict 
alternatives, but more as limiting cases, in between there is a continuum 
of operating modes through which the Creator is present and active in 
the world. Multidimensional models of reality, developed for example 
by Karl Popper and Herman Dooyeweerd may provide an inner-wordly 
analogy. They recognize different dimensions of reality, not all of which 
are accessible to a physical description.11 In such a perspective, human 
thought and will is linked to physical processes (foremost in the brain), 
10 See Lewis (1960: chap. 8).
11  See also Nagel (2012). Nagel argues for irreducible teleological and axiological 
principles at work in nature, albeit his resistance to any theistic reading of them.
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but nevertheless go beyond what can be scientifically explained. Human 
liberty is not contradicted by the scientific description of these processes, 
but indicates that natural science does not capture all of reality. The control 
human thought exercises over bodily processes comes in a  variety of 
degrees, from the instinctive, non-reflective response, at the one end, to 
the carefully pondered deliberation unhampered by any malfunctioning 
of the brain, at the other. It may be that we find here the best analogy, in 
order to understand various modes of divine action in the world.12
CHANCE: AN OBSTACLE TO GOD’S ACTION?
We have seen that it’s not necessary to resort to chance, in order to 
make space for God’s action in our world. Let us now consider a second 
question: does chance threaten God’s sovereignty? It’s quite curious 
to observe two opposing attitudes among believers: some hope that 
chance will solve the difficulty of understanding God’s action, but others 
consider that chance is an obstacle which does not allow God to control 
everything. But both these positions are mistaken and neglect to take 
fully into account divine transcendence. God is not one cause among 
others, accessible to scientific description. Thus his action does not enter 
into conflict with natural causes, so that chance would be necessary, in 
order to make room for it. Nor is his sovereignty hindered by the absence 
of natural causes. For example, quantum indeterminism does not imply 
that God could only predict or determine events at the atomic level with 
a certain probability. It is true that quantum indeterminism is objective, 
but the restriction is only valid on the level of physical causality. As with 
any scientific theory, quantum mechanics doesn’t limit what God can do.
As much as the Bible emphasizes that the natural order is grounded in 
creation, equally it insists on the control the Lord exerts over fortuitous 
events. A  proverb states this conviction in a  very straightforward 
manner: ‘The lot is cast into the lap, but its every decision is from the 
Lord’ (Proverbs 16:33). Most interesting are the texts which talk of hòq 
as imposed by the Creator’s will to the sea. The sea, in the mythology 
of peoples around Israel, symbolises the forces of chaos, the disorder 
which threatens to wipe out humanity’s vital space. To say that God’s hòq 
is imposed on the sea, means that nothing can evade being determined 
12 For further development of these intimations, see Jaeger (2012a: 299-302, 307-10).
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by it. The Hebrew word allows two translations: depending on the 
context, it can be translated as ‘limit, border’, or as ‘law, rule’. In certain 
passages, it clearly has the second sense (Jeremiah 31:35-36; cf. Job 
38:10; Proverbs 8:29):
Thus speaks the Lord, who establishes the sun to light the day,
the laws that govern the moon and the stars to light the night,
who stirs the sea, and its waves roar,
His name is ‘Lord of armies’:
If these laws depart from before me, declares the Lord,
the descendants of Israel will forever cease to be a nation before me.13
Thus divine sovereignty is not limited by what seems to humans to be 
out of control and unpredictable. On the contrary, what humans can’t 
control and predict is completely submitted to God’s reign. As Calvin 
wrote: ‘It was a true saying of Basil the Great, that Fortune and Chance 
are heathen terms; the meaning of which ought not to occupy pious 
minds.’ (Calvin 1845: I.XVI.8) More exactly, it’s chance, in the sense 
of absence of a  metaphysical cause, which doesn’t have a  place in the 
created world. No principle of chance independent of God’s providence, 
no deity Fortuna or Tychè can compete with the Lord.
CHANCE UNDER GOD’S SOVEREIGNTY
But beware: don’t confuse metaphysical determination with natural 
determination. Chance, in the sense of absence of natural cause, finds 
its place in the created world, as once more Calvin writes: ‘Though all 
things are ordered by the counsel and certain arrangement of God, to 
us, however, they are fortuitous.’ (Calvin 1845: I.XVI.9) As the biblical 
God controls all events determined by the laws of nature (and the initial 
conditions), he controls all events without a natural cause. Neuroscientist 
Donald MacKay states it in the following way:
The God of biblical theism is beholden to none to account for his creative 
agency. If he freely wills into being a succession of events in which one 
half of the sub-microscopic details at any time are unspecified by their 
precursors, this would involve no inconsistency with his character, still 
less with his sovereignty, as portrayed in the Bible. (MacKay 1978: 30)
13 My translation, see Jaeger (2010: 162-9, 150-3).
160 LYDIA JAEGER
Faith in God’s sovereignty does not necessarily lead to a deterministic, 
and even less to a fatalistic world- and life-view. For on one hand, God’s 
decrees transcend the world. One cannot conclude from the fact that 
God ‘works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will’ 
(Ephesians 1:11), to determinism on the level of natural causality. In the 
words of Calvin:
We do not admit the term Fate ... For we do not with the Stoics imagine 
a  necessity consisting of a  perpetual chain of causes, and a  kind of 
involved series contained in nature, but we hold that God is the disposer 
and ruler of all things. (Calvin 1845: I.XVI.8)
As the transcendent primary cause, God does not normally put aside 
secondary causes; on the contrary, he provides the necessary foundation, 
so that each creature can act according to its own constitution.
On the other hand, providence is the act of a personal God and does 
not come down to a blind, non-rational determination, unlike Stoic fate. 
In this way, we can admit, at the same time, God’s absolute sovereignty 
over the world and the chance character of many events, when considered 
from within the world. Once again Calvin:
As the order, method, end, and necessity of events, are, for the most part, 
hidden in the counsel of God, though it is certain that they are produced 
by the will of God, they have the appearance of being fortuitous, such 
being the form under which they present themselves to us, whether 
considered in their own nature, or estimated according to our knowledge 
and judgement. (Calvin 1845: I.XVI.9)
It is interesting to compare the biblical view with rival metaphysical 
conceptions and the place they can or cannot give to chance. First, 
scientism, which considers that science delivers a complete description 
of everything, that nothing exists which science could not, in principle, 
explain. Chance forces a  limit on scientism: it has to recognise that 
science doesn’t explain everything that happens, as certain things happen 
without any cause accessible to science. Second, deism, which considers 
that God, in the beginning, created the world, and left it then to the pre-
established laws, without intervening any more. Chance forces deism to 
allow for realities which do not follow from God’s original creation. Two 
solutions are on offer:
 – Either the deist simply acknowledges that some events are not 
determined by the order which the Creator instituted in the 
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beginning, thus are (at least partially) independent of Him. But 
in a certain sense, this comes down to giving them a quasi-divine 
status, considering that they are their own cause. In fact, this is 
a form of (philosophical) polytheism.
 – Or chance pushes the deist towards a higher view of providence: 
recognising God’s continued action beyond initial creation makes 
space for events which are not connected to preceding events by 
natural causality, without giving them quasi-divine status.
To state it more bluntly: chance forces the deist to choose between 
polytheism and theism.
ORDERLY CHANCE IN A CREATED WORLD
As we have seen, it is possible to believe in God’s sovereignty over 
everything and to accept that certain events count as chance on the 
scientific level. A  clear distinction between the primary transcendent 
cause and secondary natural causes leads us to understand that something 
can be part of God’s plan, without having a natural cause. Those who 
believe in divine omniscience and omnipotence should not be bothered 
by chance and its important role in contemporary science. But let us take 
a further step: Is it really sufficient to show that chance is no obstacle to 
faith in God? Many people stop at the scientific description of chance 
events. Why add metaphysics and talk of transcendent causality in the 
absence of natural causes?
The answer to these questions depends, above all, on the general 
attitude one has towards the Christian faith. Those who believe in the 
biblical God will resist the idea that transcendent causality is a more or 
less arbitrary add-on. On the contrary, somebody for whom this faith is 
mistaken could not accept the view that everything is grounded in the 
Creator and his action. The debate goes beyond the scope of this article 
and concerns the overall plausibility of the biblical worldview. Let us just 
mention two arguments which are directly linked to science and the role 
chance plays in it.
The presuppositions of science in harmony with creation
First, creation accounts for several central presuppositions of science. It 
explains the existence of a stable natural order, why this order is accessible 
to human knowledge, and why its exploration is a  noble activity. The 
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biblical worldview even leads to the experimental method of modern 
science insofar as it sees creation as a  free divine act: God could have 
given this world a  different form or create different natural laws. It is 
not sufficient to reason about nature, but it is necessary to go and ‘look’, 
by doing experiments, in order to discover which world God has really 
decided to create. The good match between the doctrine of creation and 
the scientific method counts towards explaining why the Christian faith 
assisted the birth of science as we know it today.14
Chance and the creation of matter
Second, the form chance takes in a  created world matches well with 
chance as we see it in contemporary science. The central notion in this 
context is the liberty of creation. Creation doesn’t flow from God’s nature, 
but from his will, as the book of Revelation sings: ‘You created all things, 
and by your will they were created and have their being’ (Revelation 4:11; 
cf. Ephesians 1:11; 1 Corinthians 15:38). Because of the freedom of the 
creative act, the world is not necessary, but contingent: it could not exist, 
and it could be otherwise than it is. This leads to a  radically different 
understanding of the contingency of the world than in the Greek view of 
a world formed by a demiurge. As Wolfhart Pannenberg puts it:
The transformation of the concept of contingency is that the contingent 
is now no longer based on the indeterminacy of matter, but on the 
freedom of God’s will as the creative ground of the world and all its parts. 
(Pannenberg 1994: 1052)
Unlike the biblical Creator, the demiurge works on pre-existing, eternal 
matter, in order to impart form to it. This leads to a dualistic view: on 
one hand, form, reason, order; on the other, matter which eludes rational 
investigation. Creation doesn’t admit such a  dualism: God created ex 
nihilo; everything, including matter, comes from his hand. Therefore 
nothing in the created world is absolutely disordered or chaotic; nothing 
is radically irrational. This view is in accordance with the fact that chance 
in modern science is open to mathematical description. In fact, it is 
possible to formulate laws which govern random phenomena, even if 
only for their average values or their probability. Thus chance in science 
is no first principle opposed to form or order, as was Greek matter. This 
is not only true for ‘games of chance’, of which the tossing of a coin is 
14 See Jaeger (2006 : chap. 1 and 3).
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the most simple and the most widely known. These games are in fact 
deterministic  – but because of the complexity of intervening causes, 
we can’t trace the exact evolution. ‘Ordered’ chance, as we expect it in 
a created world, happens even in quantum mechanics, although quantum 
theory certainly provides the purest form of chance we know of. The 
principle of causality doesn’t apply universally; nevertheless it is possible 
to write down mathematical equations which describe microscopic 
processes. Quantum indeterminism does not imply the return of Greek 
irrational matter. The microscopic world contradicts, for sure, many of 
our intuitions acquired in the everyday world of mesoscopic dimensions. 
But quantum mechanics does not take us away from mathematical 
science which Newton and others constructed from the conviction that 
our world is created.15
CONCLUSION
Those interested in understanding God’s action in the world should 
guard themselves against two (over-?)reactions to chance: chance neither 
provides an explanation for, nor is it a threat to divine action.
First, we have seen that chance does not provide an explanation for 
special divine action, which would include such action in the scientific 
world-picture. Neither quantum indeterminacy nor chaos theory provide 
the necessary leeway for divine action to happen without ‘breaching’ 
scientific laws. But we have also seen that chance models of divine action 
typically rely on a  reductionist interpretation of the world. If physical 
science captures only certain aspects of the world, there is no need to look 
for a physical model of divine action. In fact, the most promising inner-
worldly analogy may well be provided by human action understood non-
monistically. As human thought and will are exercised through, but are 
not reducible to physical brain processes, God is actively present in His 
world. There is no need to look for a scientifically acceptable description 
of his action, as science does not fully comprehend all aspects of reality.
Second, chance does not hamper God’s ability to act in the world 
either. As his sovereign control is not on the same level as the natural 
order, it is wrong to conclude from the absence of a  natural cause to 
15  In fact, it has been recently possible to derive the probabilistic predictions of 
quantum mechanics from non-probabilistic axioms: Mittelstaedt (1998: 47-57). See 
Jaeger (2012b: 90-93).
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metaphysical indeterminacy. As the transcendent Creator and Sustainer 
of the world, he freely chooses how to build the causal nexus of the 
created world. A created world leaves room for chance events, as God’s 
decree is not to be confused with any inner-worldly deterministic order, 
or Stoic impersonal fate. In fact, creation provides a framework for the 
understanding of chance, which is akin to what we see in modern science. 
Not only do important presuppositions of modern science follow from 
the doctrine of creation, but also creation ex nihilo, with its corollary of 
created matter, excludes any radically irrational dimension from nature, 
so that we expect chance events to yield to some form of mathematical 
description.
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